Background Knowledge

Online seminar for volunteering at Europe's (external) borders

 

3. Political and social situation of people on the move
on the external borders of the EU

The social and political situation of people on the move at Europe's (external) borders is a complex issue that requires consideration of historical, political, social, and legal realities. Jurisdictions and political practices at the borders change frequently. Therefore, we provide a brief overview of the most important developments and regulations. For further interest and questions, we refer to other organisations that deal with these developments on a daily basis and for a long time, and thus can present them much better.
 
 
 
What is important for you and your work?
  • Find out about local asylum and migration policies to better understand the situation of the people you work with and the political context in which you work. What are the migration policy regulations in theory and practice? What are the current developments on the ground?
  • Be aware of the political and social situation of the country where your project is based in. What is the political and social situation in the country (Greece, Italy, Serbia, etc.) where you want to work?
 
 

(Forced) migration

A global perspective on (forced) migration

All over the world, millions of people are forcibly displaced. The numbers have skyrocketed, especially in recent years, and are higher than ever before in the 70-year history of the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR). Only a very small proportion of the world's displaced people are seeking refuge in Europe, most people are hosted in neighbouring countries of their own country of origin.


Facts & Figures:

  • At the end of 2022, 108.4 million people were forcibly displaced worldwide (end of 2020: 82.4 million). This figure includes, among others, 62.5 million internally displaced persons (2020: 48 million). These are people who are fleeing within their country.
  • 70% of all displaced people worldwide are hosted in neighbouring countries of their countries of origin. 52% of refugees come from Syria, Ukraine and Afghanistan. Turkey, Iran, Colombia, Germany and Pakistan are the countries that host the most people.

Source: UNHCR (2023): Refugee Data Finder

(Forced) migration to and in Europe

  • The political situation of people on the move is quite different in the various states of the EU. The European Union has established common standards for handling asylum applications and dealing with those seeking protection within the framework of a Common European Asylum System (CEAS). In June 2023, there was a reform that once again greatly aggravated the existing system.
  • In reality, however, the political circumstances (parties in government, etc.), the implementation and duration of the respective asylum procedures as well as the living conditions of refugees in the respective EU host state differ greatly. Although the EU claims that the reform is intended to create common regulations, the reform is kept in such a way that great differences persist

Consequences of the European migration policy

The European migration policy increasingly relies on the externalisation and militarisation of border protection, which severely restricts the rights of protection seekers, especially in border regions, and often subjects them to inhumane conditions:

  • The inhumane conditions at Europe's external borders, with well-known examples such as the Moria (now Kara Tepe) refugee camps on Lesvos or Lipa in Bosnia and Herzegovina, are not temporary humanitarian emergencies or crises. On the contrary: the current situation is politically desired and a direct consequence of European policies that want to outsource responsibility for people seeking protection
  • Instead of establishing policy mechanisms that allow people on the move to apply for asylum in Europe in a legal and safe way, people seeking protection are in many cases arrested, beaten and increasingly criminalised at the borders. If access to asylum is granted, asylum processes usually take several months to years and asylum-seeking people are forced to live for long periods in camps with sometimes inhumane living conditions.
    Moria White Helmets, a self-organised group in the camp on Lesvos, organises mutual support under these difficult conditions.
  • In addition, there are illegal and violent push-backs (i.e. informal expulsion at the border or from within the country without the possibility to apply for asylum), pull-backs (like push-backs, except that they are carried out by the countries from which people intend to cross a border) and other discriminatory practices. Push and pull-backs take place both at the EU's external borders and within the EU, such as in the border areas of the Balkan region, at the border between Italy and France or in Calais (between the UK and France).
  • The attempt to prevent people from migrating and fleeing to the EU no longer takes place only at the European borders, but is outsourced by the EU to African or Eastern European states. In order to outsource the responsibility of protecting refugees to other states and to prevent people from fleeing to Europe, the EU cooperates with states such as Turkey, Niger, Tunisia and the paramilitary militias of the so-called "Libyan Coast Guard". Groups like Refugees in Libya and Refugees in Tunisia are fighting against the prevailing violence and for justice, especially in North African states.

The podcast Fractured deals with current events and political decisions concerning flight and migration in Europe (EN)
The Border Violence Monitoring Network draws attention to border violence and especially push-backs (EN)

 
 

Legal foundations and asylum in Europe

The Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and the Dublin III Regulation

The Common European Asylum System (CEAS) essentially consists of two regulations and several directives and was reformed in June 2023:

  • The Dublin III Regulation(see below), regulates the responsibility of EU Member States.
  • The EURODAC Regulation was created for the Europe-wide fingerprint comparison of asylum seekers.
  • The Reception Directive regulates common standards for the living conditions of asylum seekers.
  • The Qualification Directive regulates who qualifies as a refugeeor a person in need of subsidiary protection.
  • The Procedure Directive regulates the minimum standards of asylum procedures..

We try to briefly explain the most important aspects. In a very simplified chronological way, we deal with various agreements, regulations and reforms that shape the European asylum system.

A very good summary of information on European asylum policy can be found at Mediendienst Integration (DE)
The European Council on Refugees ECRE regularly writes articles on current developments (EN)

Asylum procedures

Despite European wide minimum standards for the implementation of asylum procedures, the procedures in the European states differ greatly.

On these pages you will find an overview of the asylum procedures in Greece, Italy and Germany:
The Dublin III Regulation

  • The so-called Dublin III Regulation came into force in 2014. It regulates which EU-member-state is responsible for international protection when an asylum application is made. In short, this regulation states that the EU member state responsible for an asylum application is the one in which the refugees first set foot on EU territory, or in which the refugees' fingerprints were first taken. Although there are other regulations for determining the responsibility, the first country of entry is the one that applies most frequently.
  • The aim of the regulation is to prevent further internal European migration and multiple asylum applications in different EU member states, because according to EU law, the asylum application can be rejected as inadmissible if the person seeking protection has entered from a so-called "safe third country". This is justified by the fact that the person seeking protection could already have found protection from political persecution in the so-called “safe third country” Safe third countries” include the states of the EU, Norway and Switzerland.
  • The only exceptions are family reunifications:
    Family reunification is an option for protection seekers who have close family members in another European country. This includes spouses or minor children and, in the case of unaccompanied minors, parents, siblings, uncles and aunts or grandparents.
Consequences:
  • This procedure leads to countries at Europe's external borders, such as Italy, Spain, Greece or Poland, receiving the majority of refugees in Europe without being adequately prepared or receiving adequate support from other EU member states. And people seeking protection are stranded in Europe's border regions without being able to move freely within the Schengen area or, if they continue their journey, are in danger of being deported back to the countries where they were first registered.
  • The responsibility for supporting protection seekers is thus shifted to a few states, even if humane care for those seeking protection is not guaranteed.
For more information on the Dublin III procedure, see Informationsverbund Asyl und Migration e. V. (DE) or Info Migrants (EN)
The EU-Turkey-Deal

What is the EU-Turkey Agreement?
  • In March 2016, the so-called EU-Turkey Agreement came into force. The background to the agreement is that in 2015, a large number of people entered the EU through Turkey's borders with Greece. The EU wanted and wants to stop this and prevent people on the move from entering Greece through this migration route. Roughly summarized, the agreement states that Turkey should strengthen border protection and thus prevent protection seekers from continuing their journey to the EU. To that end, the EU has provided up to 6 million euros between 2016 and 2018 to improve the lives of protection seekers in Turkey.
  • Refugees without a claim to asylum in Greece, are to be deported from the Greek islands directly back to Turkey. During an initial examination of the responsibility for the asylum application, it is thus determined whether Turkey already offers the person sufficient protection. Since Turkey has been declared a “safe third country” under the EU-Turkey Agreement, asylum seekers must prove that Turkey is not a safe place for them. In return, the EU has committed to directly host one Syrian refugee from Turkey for every Syrian person deported from the Greek islands to Turkey.
  • In total, 2,140 people have been deported back to Turkey under the EU-Turkey agreement by the end of March 2020. Since March 2020, Turkey no longer accepts rejected asylum seekers.
Developments since February 2020:
  • In February 2020, the Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğgan announced that the Turkish border with Greece would be opened to people of the move. The reason given was lack of aid payments from the EU.
  • The reaction of Greece, supported by the EU, was militarizing the border and suspending the right to asylum for one month.
  • Many people who arrived in Greece during this period were and are still being deported back to Turkey without protection under the rule of law.
  • Even after 2020, push-backs are still a daily reality and reception conditions for people on the Greek islands have deteriorated to the point where even the most basic needs are not being met.
You can find more information on the developments in Greece in the period February 2020 - June 2020 in this brochure: Stop War On Migrants (EN & GR)
Also recommended is the MONITOR report "Refugees in Greece: Europe's breach of law at the external border" (DE ) and the Podcast Memento Moria - Was heute an Europas Grenzen passiert (DE)

Sources:
Balkanbrücke: Griechenland (DE)
Schwarze, T. (2017): Für Merkel funktioniert der Deal (DE)
Dimitriadi, A. (2022): Migration und Migrationspolitik in Griechenland (DE)
New Pact on Migration and Asylum 2020

In autumn 2020, the EU member states presented a draft of a new migration and asylum pact that was supposed to reform European asylum policy and, according to their own statements, establish "improved and faster procedures throughout the asylum and migration system". Even though this pact was heavily criticised by NGOs, it now serves as the basis for the eventually implemented CEAS reform.

For more information, watch this MONITOR report: "EU Migration Pact: Injustice as Law" (DE ) or For more information, watch this video of the Border Violence Monitoring Network:Who does the EU’s Migration Pact Really Benefit? (EN)
Sources:
Europäische Kommission (2020): Pressemitteilung (DE)
Flüchtlingsrat Baden-Württemberg (2020): Überblick zum neuen Asyl- und Migrationspaket der EU (DE)
Tagesschau (2020): Menschenverachtend oder gute Basis? (DE)
Tagesschau (2020): Was steht im EU-Migrationspakt? (DE)
Mediendienst Integration (2020): EU-Migrationspakt steht in Kritik (DE)
The CEAS-Reform 2023

The reform of the Common European Asylum System was presented by the EU as a groundbreaking deal. However, if one takes a closer look at the concrete contents, it quickly becomes clear that the right to asylum will be severely restricted.

What does the CEAS reform entail?
  • border procedures
  • Asylum procedures are to take place directly at the European external borders with shortened times.
    However, these are not real asylum procedures, because they are not about flight reasons, but about the country in which the respective person was last. It is only checked whether he or she is safe there.
    During this time, the asylum seeker is considered not yet to have entered the EU (fiction of no entry), so he or she cannot move freely and is detained.
    If a person is not registered directly at the external border and later checked e.g. in Germany, the mechanism of the border procedure can also be activated and carried out there - far from the external border.
    Children over 12 and vulnerable people are also not exempt from these border procedures.

    Consequences: The right to asylum, which is about why a person fled, is severely restricted, as the focus is not on the individual flight reasons, but on the country in which the person was last staying. This is often Tunisia or Turkey, both of which are classified as safe, even though neither country can offer safe conditions (see e.g. Refugees in Tunisia). There is a threat of chain deportations, i.e. further deportations e.g. from Turkey to Syria or Afghanistan - countries from which people have fled. Since asylum seekers are considered as not yet entered during the border procedures, they have limited legal remedies to defend themselves against wrong decisions. Moreover, during the shortened times, vulnerable people often cannot be recognised as such and protected accordingly. Apart from this, it is questionable how these border procedures can be implemented, given the failure of the previous hotspots and camps in Greece and Italy, which is being carried out on the backs of refugees.

  • Tightening of the Dublin system
  • Instead of replacing the Dublin system, it will be further strengthened.
    There is still no mandatory distribution of refugees among the EU member states. Instead, the countries of first entry remain responsible.
    If people travel on in order to build a new life in e.g. Germany after their first registration, e.g. in Italy, the deadline for Germany to deport the people back to Italy (so-called Dublin transfer) will be extended to 1 or 3 years.

    Consequences: The increase in push-packs, i.e. refoulement at the border, can continue to be legitimised as preventive border protection, although this practice clearly breaks with human rights. The fact that the distribution of asylum seekers among the various member states is not integrated into the reform means that the border states have no incentive to actually carry out asylum procedures. In addition, the extension of the deportation period to the EU state of first registration means that accommodation with acquaintances or church and citizens' asylum (the accommodation of people threatened with deportation in church congregations or private homes) will hardly be possible, because this period is characterised by fear and insecurity. Already the existing time limit of 6 or 18 months is unbearably long. Moreover, the extensive exclusion from social benefits makes it almost impossible to bridge this period.

  • "Solidarity mechanism"
  • The "solidarity mechanism" allows EU states that refuse to accept refugees to pay a financial contribution for deportations instead of receptions or to fund third countries to restrict migration into the EU.

    Consequences: States can withdraw from their responsibility to provide protection for people.

  • Outsourcing of asylum procedures to third countries
  • Asylum procedures shall be carried out in countries outside the EU.

    Consequences: In third countries, there are hardly any lawyers specialised in European asylum law with whom asylum seekers could appeal against negative decisions, which deprives them of legal protection because incorrect decisions cannot be corrected. Furthermore, these asylum centres have an impact on the states in which they are located, because stricter border controls would have to be introduced there. This means a restriction of West African freedom of movement and thus a destruction of local economies based on freedom of movement. New reasons for forced migration can thus be created and human rights violations and deaths in border regions shifted to the Global South. In this way, the EU's migration and border policies and their consequences are outsourced to regions that lie outside European (media) attention.

For further reading:
ECRE (2023): A possible agreement on the reform of CEAS at the council in June. What is at stake? (EN)
ECRE (2023): Editorial: Migration Pact Agreement Point by Point (EN)
Pro Asyl (2023): Die Bundesregierung und ihre Schönrednerei im Faktencheck (DE)
Übersicht der aktuellen Debatte zur Reform des EU-Asylsystems (DE)
Netzwerk Fluchtforschung (2023): Fluchtforschung gegen Mythen 8 (DE)
Taxis, Clara (2023): EU-Asylreform: Was nicht sicher ist, wird sicher genannt (DE)

Sources:
Pichl, Maximilian (2023): Europas Werk und Deutschlands Beitrag: Wie der EU-Asylkompromiss das Recht auf Asyl aushöhlen könnte (DE)
Pro Asyl (2023): FAQ zur geplanten Reform des Gemeinsamen Europäischen Asylsystems (GEAS) (DE)
Pro Asyl (2023): Haftlager an den Außengrenzen und Abschiebungen in Drittstaaten: Ist das die Zukunft? (DE)
Rat für Migration (2023): Besser keine Reform als diese: Warum die Bundesregierung die GEAS-Reform stoppen sollte (DE, EN)
Frontex

  • Frontex is the European Border and Coast Guard Agency and has been in operation since 2004 to support European member states in their border management. The emphasis here is explicitly on border protection and not the protection of human lives.
  • Initially a small agency based in Poland, it has become one of the largest agencies in the EU. Its budget has increased by 7,560% since 2005 to 5.6 trillion Euro for the years 2021-2027. Frontex has its own staff as well as officers provided by member states.
  • The agency works at Europe's external borders, for example in Greece, the Western Balkans, Spain and Italy. It is also one of the main coordinators of deportations from the EU and cooperates with more than 20 non-European countries as part of the European externalisation policy (outsourcing of responsibility for migration control to third countries). This includes the training of the so-called Libyan coast guard, consisting of militias that are repeatedly criticised for human rights violations.
  • Frontex uses a narrative about migration and border management in which migrants are often portrayed as a danger, which supports and reproduces racist and nationalist views on migration.
  • Frontex is increasingly criticised. There are repeated reports of direct and indirect involvement in illegal push-backs and violence against migrants: Frontex officials witness push-backs in the Aegean Sea by the Greek coast guard without intervening and Frontex ships are also involved in push-backs in the Aegean Sea themselves. According to reports from the civilian sea rescue organisation Sea-Watch, the EU agency is also involved in pull-backs to Libya in the central Mediterranean: Frontex's aerial reconnaissance aircraft refuses to cooperate with NGOs and cooperates predominantly with the so-called Libyan coast guard to have protection seekers brought back to Libya. Since Frontex is involved, but the actors who ultimately carry out the operations come from Libya, Frontex tries to shift the responsibility for these pull-backs away from itself.
  • In addition, the agency is criticised for its lack of human rights monitoring capabilities. It is very difficult for people who experience rights violations by Frontex to take the agency to court. Moreover, the direct and indirect involvement in push- and pull-backs shows that even internal control mechanisms of the agency are not sufficient to guarantee the protection of human rights.

Read more here:

Sources:
Pro Asyl (2020): Beteiligung von Frontex und deutschen Einsatzkräften an Pushbacks muss Konsequenzen haben (DE)
Pro Asyl (2020): Frontex - eine Grenzschutzagentur der Superlative? (DE)
Frontex Investigation (2021): Kooperation zwischen Frontex und der sogenannten Libyschen Küstenwache (DE)
Abolish Frontex (2021): What is Frontex? (EN)
Sea-Watch (2021): Crimes of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency Frontex in the Central Mediterranean Sea (EN)
 
 

The Mediterranean and Balkan region

The Mediterranean and the Balkan region play a special role for protection and asylum seekers in Europe for geographical and political reasons (see Dublin III procedure), as most of them are (forced to) stay here. Therefore, we have put together some information about the specifics and the situation on the ground, although it should be noted that these vary greatly depending on the specific location and are subject to constant change.

Since not only these places are relevant and support networks are active in many other border regions, we refer here to some articles that can provide information on the political context of the respective region. Of course, this selection is only a small overview:

Italy-France: Ventimiglia

France-Great Britain: Calais

Morocco-Spain: Ceuta, Melilla:

Belarus-Poland

The Mediterranean

According to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the Mediterranean Sea is currently the deadliest border in the world. According to IOM estimates, more than 2,400 people died or are considered missing in 2022 while fleeing across the Mediterranean. Almost ⅔ of them have died or are considered missing on the central Mediterranean route (via Libya and Tunisia to Italy and Malta). In the absence of safe flight routes, many people try to reach Europe via the Mediterranean despite this immense danger. A European solution to this state-created humanitarian catastrophe is not in sight, because there are no rescue operations by the European institutions and hardly any legal routes to seek refuge in Europe. On the contrary, there are more and more attempts by the states and the European Union to block search and rescue operations by civil and non-profit organisations, e.g. by criminalising them

Sources:
IOM (2017): New Study Concludes Europe’s Mediterranean Border Remains 'World’s Deadliest' (EN)
Missing Migrants Project (2022): Missing Migrants Recorded in Mediterranean (EN)
borderline-europe - Menschenrechte ohne Grenzen e.V. (2021): RETTUNG UNERWÜNSCHT - Italiens Versuche, die Seenotrettung Geflüchteter zu kriminalisieren (DE)

Which actors are active in which region of the Mediterranean? Civil search and rescue organisations are mainly active in the central Mediterranean. In the western and eastern Mediterranean, state institutions are mainly responsible. However, there can often be no talk of rescue, because they are often not on the scene in case of acute danger. Instead, they focus on push-backs or are involved in alleged accidents (such as the sinking of a boat off the Greek coast in June 2023 with several hundred deaths - EN, see also Monitor - DE).

  • In the western Mediterranean, the state-run "Sociedad de Salvamento y Seguridad Marítima" from Spain with the Spanish "Guardia Civil" is primarily responsible for search and sea rescue. Since 2019, they have been working together with the Moroccan coast guard, which means that there are more push-backs to Morocco or Algeria.
  • In the eastern Mediterranean, units of the Greek and Turkish coast guards work together with Frontex. Due to the EU-Turkey agreement, the Turkish coast guard only carries out pull-backs. In the first five months of 2023, twice as many people were brought back to Turkey as arrived in Greece and Cyprus. One reason for this is that the Greek coast guard is increasingly carrying out push-backs instead of rescuing people. People who have already arrived on Greek islands are also picked up by representatives of the authorities or people wearing balaclavas and abandoned again in the Mediterranean.
  • In the central Mediterranean, protection seekers are often intercepted by the so-called Libyan and Tunisian coast guards and brought back to Libya or Tunisia, where they are usually detained under intolerable conditions. The numerous human rights violations against protection seekers in Libya have been known for years. The EU's cooperation with Libya forces refugees to stay in a country where their human rights are obviously violated. Refugees in Libya and Refugees in Tunisia make these public and campaign against them, as the situation for refugees in Tunisia has also deteriorated enormously, especially in recent years. This also includes the fact that the Tunisian coast guard is increasingly involved in pull-backs, which is partly due to new agreements between the EU and Italy with Tunisia. In addition to the patrols of the Italian coast guard, which only rarely moves beyond national waters, it is mainly civilian search and rescue organisations, such as Sea-Watch, Mission-Lifeline, Sea-Eye, Proactiva Open Arms, Resqship, Salvamento Marítimo Humanitario, Doctors Without Borders or Emergency, that rescue people seeking protection in this area. In doing so, they have to contend with immense repression from EU states. They are accused of smuggling or human trafficking, among other things, which is why they are repeatedly held in ports. After rescuing refugees, they are often not allowed access to ports, so they have to stay on the ships for unbearably long days or are assigned to distant ports to keep the ships out of the search and rescue area as long as possible.

Sources:
Mediendienst Integration (2023): Europäische Asylpolitik und Grenzschutz. (DE)
Spiegel (2023): EU stellt Tunesien Hunderte Millionen Euro in Aussicht (DE)

You can find more information and current figures on the following pages:

Concrete cases of criminalisation of sea rescue and supporters:
Criminalisation of people on the move

Not only are search and rescue organizations being criminalized for bringing people to safety, but refugees themselves are also facing legal charges for allegedly steering a boat. In both cases, the common accusation is often "facilitation of illegal entry." However, refugees don't have the same extensive networks, knowledge of European languages and/or legal systems, or financial resources to draw attention to themselves and defend against these charges. Consequently, these cases are not as visible as those involving white persons from search and rescue organisations. Furthermore, it's important to emphasize that these refugees are often like any other refugees, who, for instance, happened to be sitting near the engine, were exempted from paying for steering the boat, or were coerced into steering. Therefore, referring to "facilitation of illegal entry" is not appropriate.

You can find more information, reports, and specific cases here:
The hotspot-system and its consequences for people on the move

In 2015, the EU established so-called hotspots at the EU's southern external borders. The aim was to register all arriving asylum seekers at these hotspots. For this purpose, the national border authorities and employees of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) work together. Originally, the hotspots were intended as temporary emergency solutions, but as is so often the case, this crisis mode has been perpetuated and normalised.

Hotspots in Greece and Italy

Five hotspots have been established on the Greek islands (on Chios, Lesvos, Samos, Leros and Kos). Refugees who are registered in the hotspots have to stay on the islands for the time being. During this time, a decision is made whether they can be deported back to Turkey under the EU-Turkey agreement or apply for asylum in Greece. They often remain in the hotspots for the duration of their asylum procedure (and sometimes until deportation), which is why the hotspots are chronically overcrowded. In March 2020, the overcrowding of the hotspots reached a peak: although the hotspot centres were only designed for about 6,000 people, over 38,000 asylum-seeking people were living in the camps. Gradually, the hotspot centres are being converted or replaced into so-called "Closed Controlled Access Centres" (CCAC), which is fully funded by the EU. They already exist on Samos, Leros and Kos - and resemble high-security prisons. There is a lack of almost everything in terms of care, be it medical care, translators, psychologists, food, shade or benefit payments. Legal advice is almost non-existent. This is also due to the fact that many NGOs have left the islands due to state repression and Greece has simultaneously cut back on staff. Rejected asylum seekers and recognised refugees who are stuck on the islands no longer receive any benefits or food.

Why is the EU detaining people for no reason?
The detention centres are a consequence of the EU-Turkey agreement, as well as the fact that several EU member states refuse to receive refugees. They are not interested in human rights, which is also shown by the GEAS reform, which does not replace the camps but perpetuates them. Detained refugees, however, resist the conditions and show what the camps entail for them, like a group of women on Lesvos in the video "That's what we call a prison - "Kara Tepe" Migrant Camp, Lesvos (2022)".

For the latest figures of arrivals, see the UNHCR documents.
More information about the developments in Greece in the period February 2020 - June 2020 can be found in this brochure Stop War On Migrants (EN, GR)
More recent reports can be found at Deportation Monitoring Aegean (EN), e.g. The Dystopia in the form of a camp - The "Closed Controlled Access Centre of Samos" (2022).
Further recommended readings: “Der Moria Komplex - Verantwortungslosigkeit, Unzuständigkeit und Entrechtung fünf Jahre nach dem EU-Türkei-Abkommen und der Einführung des Hotspot-Systems” von Maximilian Pichl (DE)
Report by Refugee Support Aegean: “What is happening today in the refugee structures on the Aegean islands” on the situation on the Aegean Islands" (EN)

Four hotspots have been set up in Italy (Lampedusa, Pozzallo, Taranto and Trapani), which are also regularly overcrowded. After the registration, which usually takes only a few days, refugees theoretically proceed to the initial reception, where they can file their asylum application. However, if individuals come from a "safe third country," they are practically left on the streets with a notice to leave the country within 7 days. There are also detention centres (CPR) where people are placed in detention pending deportation. As the reception system was and is inadequate, extraordinary reception centres (CAS) were introduced in 2015, which were intended as an emergency solution for initial reception and have been perpetuated until today. These can be run by private (partly profit-oriented) operators and therefore vary greatly. The somewhat better second reception centres (SAI) are only partially accessible to people with a positive asylum decision and unaccompanied minors.

2-weekly short info "Scirocco" on Italy (DE, EN)

Sources:
Mediendienst Integration (2020): Europäische Asylpolitik und Grenzschutz.
UNHCR (2021): Aegean Islands Weekly Snapshot 19.-25. July 2021.
Colombo, Fabio (2022): Il sistema di accoglienza dei migranti in Italia, spiegato per bene (IT)
Sachverständigenrat für Integration und Migration (2021): Die Hotspots auf den griechischen Inseln: Was die EU aus ihren strukturellen Problemen für die gemeinsame Asylpolitik lernen sollte (DE)
Pro Asyl (2023): Griechische Verhältnisse – bald überall in Europa? (DE)
The Balkan Region

  • Every year, tens of thousands of people on the move try to reach Western Europe via one of the Balkan national borders in search of protection. Even after the increasing closure of Europe's external borders, in particular the official closure of the so-called Balkan route in March 2016, the countries of the Balkan region are still transit countries (i.e. countries of passage) for many people on the move.
  • In June 2023, almost 18,000 people seeking protection were registered by UNHCR in the Balkan region, 92% of them in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
  • In addition to these main transit countries, Croatia, Montenegro, Northern Macedonia, Kosovo, Albania and Romania are also transit countries in the Balkan region. The living conditions for people seeking protection vary depending on the country and camp. Moreover, some of the people on the move in the region do not live in official camps or shelters.
  • Since the border closures, border crossings in the Balkan region have become increasingly dangerous. There are increasing reports of violent and illegal push-backs (i.e. people are sent back near the border or from the interior of the country without being able to apply for asylum), mistreatment and racist attacks in the region.
  • Human rights organisations such as Pro Asyl have long criticised the Croatian border police, for example, for systematically preventing people on the move from fleeing to the EU, denying them the right to asylum and forcibly pushing them back to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Many people on the move risk their lives on these dangerous routes because of the lack of alternatives.

Serbia

  • According to UNHCR, there were 5.247 refugees and asylum seekers in Serbia in June 2023.
  • An estimated 400-500 refugees are staying in northern Serbia outside official shelters (as of July 2020) In reality, this number is likely to be much higher, as many refugees stay outside the camps near the borders, especially during the summer months. These numbers are lower than in many other countries, which does not mean that there are few people there, but indicates low media coverage and awareness.
  • According to official figures, 20 people have died inside Serbia in 2019 while trying to cross the border. However, experts estimate that the number of unreported cases is much higher. This is due to the fact that survivors of failed attempts to cross one of the borders usually do not go to the police.
  • According to the Hungarian Police, on average about 350 people were prevented from entering Hungary every day in 2022. The push-backs are often associated with violence and theft.

Here you can get more information:



Sources:
Stojić Mitrović, M.; Ahmetašević, N.; Beznec, B. und Kurnik, A. (2020): The Dark Sides of Europeanisation. Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European Border Regime (EN)
ProAsyl (2020): Türsteher Kroatien: Brutale Menschenrechtsverletzungen im Namen Europas (DE)
MVI, Collective Aid und Construct Solidarity: Bericht Nordserbien Dezember 2022/Januar 2023 (EN)
UNHCR: South Eastern Europe. Operational Portal. Refugee Situations.
UNHCR: Serbia Update May-June 2023
 
 

Political and social situation

Social situation of refugees and living conditions in the camps

Due to the EU's efforts to reduce migration movements to Europe and to keep positive asylum decisions at the lowest possible level, a large number of refugees in Europe find themselves in a situation that is not only very precarious but also extremely hopeless.

They are increasingly met with resentment or even racist violence from the local population. In addition, many people seeking protection often find themselves in a waiting loop of official appointments, applications and decisions, which usually drags on for several years. And in quite a few cases, deportation awaits them at the end of this draining process. Because the process of applying for asylum is so arduous and lengthy, asylum seekers sometimes have to remain in the camps assigned to them for several years. At the same time, the living conditions of the refugees vary not only from country to country, but even from camp to camp.

The following aspects can have an influence on living conditions in the camps:

Housing and sanitation:

The forms of accommodation of asylum seekers in Europe range from larger halls, which are only separated by curtains, to tents and containers, to blocks of flats and decentralized accommodation. Aspects such as the number, equipment, and maintenance of sanitary facilities are decisive factors that can influence not only the well-being but also the health of the residents of a camp. The possibility of privacy as well as the location of the sanitary facilities also determine the vulnerability and the feeling of safety - especially of girls and women. The living situation in camps in particular made it impossible to comply with protective measures such as physical isolation during the COVID 19 pandemic, which is why people seeking protection were exposed to an increased risk of infection.
Financial support

The financial support of refugees is regulated differently in each country. In Greece, for example, refugees who are registered in a camp receive a so-called cash card. With this, they can withdraw a certain amount each month, which is measured according to the size of their family. However, this amount is so tight that it is just sufficient for the most basic needs, but people have to rely on support from non-profit organizations and projects for further purchases (clothing, household items, etc.).
Food:

Food supplies can vary greatly from camp to camp. While in some camps people have the opportunity to cook for themselves, in other camps this is prohibited and they are provided with packaged meals on a daily basis, most of which contain little nutrition. In some cases, the food supply is also provided by humanitarian organizations or projects.
Location of the camp and freedom of movement:

The location of the camp is very decisive for the freedom of movement or the possibility to stay outside the camp. For example, if the camp is located far away from the nearest major city its residents usually have to pay a lot of money for public transportation. sylum seekers are dependent on these transport connections, as they have to appear for numerous appointments at various authorities. But also in order to take advantage of the support services offered by organizations, many refugees have to travel several hours from their remote camps. The location of the camps can thus also have an enormous impact on the opportunities for social participation. Imposed curfews during the COVID-19 pandemic further restricted already severely limited freedom of movement. Depending on the type of camp, there may be no freedom of movement at all and people may be detained in the camps.
Access by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and projects:

Whether and to what extent external organizations and projects have access to camps can greatly influence the nature of the camp, the living conditions of its residents, and the opportunities for activities and participation. In many cases, access has now been severely restricted. If a camp is completely closed off from any external access, little to no information about the conditions in the camp will reach the public. However, it should not go unmentioned that not every aid project promises to improve living conditions in the camp. In the past, some projects were well-intentioned, but they were not designed for sustainability or longevity, were abandoned, or proceeded in an ill-considered manner thus raising false hopes. Well-intentioned projects can also cause disappointment and damage.
Conflict potential:

The composition of the residents of a camp can determine the general mood and the potential for conflict. It can happen, for example, that people from ethnic, religious or national groups who are at war with each other in their country of origin suddenly have to live in the same neighborhood. This can sometimes lead to (violent) conflicts. However, most refugees cannot leave or change their camps at their own discretion. In Greece, for example, they lose their entitlement to the cash card as soon as they leave the camp for the long term. Thus, if conflicts or violent clashes occur, they are faced with the choice of continuing to expose themselves to the risk or losing their entitlement to the Cash Card.

This is only a selection of aspects that influence the living conditions of people seeking protection in camps. It quickly becomes clear that there is no "one" camp. Moreover, many refugees do not have access to a camp for various reasons and live on the streets or in abandoned buildings. These people live in the most precarious conditions. With the exception of some projects, they do not receive any kind of support. Due to poor living conditions, they are at higher risk of falling ill and in many cases are subject to arbitrary police violence.

Points that you should take into consideration for your work: Is the project responsible for a specific camp, does it serve several camps in the region, or is it an offer that is sought out by the refugees themselves in a central location? What kind of camps and compositions of people are involved? What potential conflicts are possible and must be considered in the work?


Political and Social Situation in Host Countries

As an international volunteer or activist you should be familiar with the political and social circumstances of the country you are working in. A feeling for the country and the local population can help you to find your way around and to place your work in the regional context. Therefore, try to inform yourself a little about the country, the region, the politics and the society in advance.

Important questions can be:

  • What is the political and social situation of the country you want to work in?
  • Who is currently in government?
  • What are the current political and social conflicts in the country/region?
  • How are public debates about the topics of migration, flight and solidarity-based support work shaping up?



Example: Greece

  • EU member states like Greece are still suffering from the consequences of the financial and euro crisis in 2007 and 2010 respectively and the imposed austerity measures. In addition, there are losses in the tourism sector due to high numbers of arriving protection seekers in 2015-2016 and also the Corona pandemic.
  • Especially if we come from privileged EU member states like Germany, we should reflect on the living conditions and social realities on the ground as well as our own position as international volunteers in this context.
  • As a comparison, Greece has an unemployment rate of about 11.2% (as of April 2023) and youth unemployment rate of 27.4%. In Germany, the unemployment rate is only 3.9% and the youth unemployment rate is 5.4%. In Greece, moreover, state support for the people in need is not guaranteed in the same way as in Germany, and many unemployed Greeks are also dependent on support from non-profit organizations and their families.



Sources:
Statista (2023): Europäische Union. Jugendarbeitslosenquoten in den Mitgliedsstaaten im April 2023
Statista (2023): Europäische Union. Arbeitslosenquoten in den Mitgliedsstaaten im April 2023

 
 

Stay informed!

Where and how can you stay up to date?


In the (mainstream) media, there is less and less coverage of the situation of people on the move in Europe and the European border region. Here you can get updated information:

Regular to daily updates on policies, practices and events at Europe's borders:


Information for people on the move:


Documentation of push-backs and border violence:


Other interesting organizations and links:

 
 
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